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Abstract
This study computes measures of the degree of independence in practice of telecommunications
regulators for Latin American and Caribbean countries in a new data set for 23 countries between 1990
and 2004. We focus on the degree to which governments are able to commit to preserve regulator
independence. We combine this information with data on legal independence to construct indices of
regulator independence that are more realistic than those used by the existing literature. Econometric
results confirm that regulator independence has a positive impact on telecommunications performance,
but purely legal indices appear to under-estimate this impact.
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1. Introduction
The regulation of network industries faces a time inconsistency or commitment prob-
lem:1 given the irreversible nature of investments, regulators have the temptation to set
prices that are too low once investments have been sunk. Mirroring the solution to the time
inconsistency problem in monetary policy, academics have suggested that regulators that are
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ning errors or shortcomings.independent from government and that value industry profits more than representative politi-
cians may alleviate under-investment. Arguments of expertise and policy stability reinforce
the rationale of independence. International institutions and many countries claim to follow
the academic advice and have advocated the creation of such independent regulators in net-
work industries in the recent past.
The problem is that the creation of independent regulators does not solve, but it relo-
cates, the commitment problem, which is transformed into one of the government commit-
ting not to undermine the independence of the regulator. Thus, work on the measurement of
independence2 which only takes into account legal provisions, especially those studies that
only construct dummy variables, as Estache, Goicoechea and Manacorda (2006, 12) point
out, “may not capture the degree of independence.” Laws (de jure independence) leave a
broad margin for interpretation and, as Cukierman (1992, 383) argues, “even when laws are
very specific, these could be not operational if there exists a tradition or way of thinking in
government that things must be made in a different way”.
The measurement of independence in practice for Central Banks is quite developed in
the literature,3 but this is not the case for network industries.4 We contribute to filling this
gap by developing indices of independence in practice for the Telecommunications Regula-
tory Agencies (TRA’s) in 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries. Following the empir-
ical Central Bank independence literature, we measure the real duration in office of the reg-
ulator and its relationship with political changes. We compute with this a new, more realistic
index of regulatory independence. Econometric results using this index show that independ-
ence has a positive effect on network penetration, and that this effect would be under-esti-
mated using only a legalistic approach to independence.
In Section 2 we survey the independence debate and the studies on the independence in
practice of Central Banks. In Section 3 we explain how we have constructed measures of regu-
lator independence in practice by observing the actual time that regulators stay in their jobs;
adding this to an existing index of legal regulation we create an index of both de jure and de
facto independence. In Section 4 we quantify the impact of this measure of actual independence
on fixed telecommunications penetration, using a regression analysis that takes the potential en-
dogeneity of regulation into account. Finally, the last section presents concluding comments.
2. Related literature
In infrastructure industries, the importance of institutions is mainly driven by the sunk na-
ture of the massive investments needed, which is the source of a time inconsistency problem,
highlighted by Levy and Spiller (1996), Shirley, Cowan and Noll (2000), Noll (2000), Noll and
Shirley (2002), Gutiérrez (2003a), Levine, Stern and Trillas (2005) and Newbery (2000), among
others. Many countries face major difficulties in inducing sufficient investment to meet the ca-
pacity needs -at least at an acceptable cost of capital. Hence, the role of the regulatory institu-
tions is crucial in providing the credibility that will support the necessary investment flows. 
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propriation activities, which may foster electoral support via short term benefits for con-
sumers such as, e.g., lower prices, is crucial for the ability to secure often badly needed in-
vestment in infrastructure. Such credibility is linked to the institutional endowment of a
country. One potential way to alleviate the time inconsistency problem in infrastructure pol-
icy, which has been explored recently both in developing and in developed countries, is reg-
ulator independence. If contracts (private contracts or concession contracts) are possible, dis-
cretional regulation is less necessary. However, complete contracts are even more
problematic in developing countries than in developed ones. Discretional regulation can be
replaced by ex ante rules, but these tend to perform poorly if there are unforeseen contingen-
cies. Besides, in many cases regulation and contracts are complementary, because i) some
sort of supervision is necessary to enforce previous agreements and react to unforeseen con-
tingencies or contract renegotiation; and ii) discretional independent regulation needs to be
accompanied by mechanisms of social control, accountability, and adequate procedures, if it
is to obtain social legitimacy and market credibility.
In countries with skewed income distributions (such as many Latin American countries),
governments pay a political price in terms of not satisfying the median (relatively poor) voter if
they do not renege on promises made to remunerate specific private-sector investments. Thus the
solution of combining privatization with strategically delegating into a relatively pro-industry
regulator, in a similar way as governments delegate into an inflation averse central banker (see
Levine, Stern and Trillas 2005).5 The need to appoint authorities with a high expertise in com-
plex matters and to avoid policy polarization reinforces the arguments in favour of delegation.
The problem of course is that independence does not solve, but it relocates, the commit-
ment problem, which transforms itself into one of the government credibly committing not
to undermine the independence of the regulator, which many countries have found very dif-
ficult. In a definition of Central Bank independence, Walsh (2005, 10) states that “legal
measures of Central Bank independence may not reflect the relationship between the Cen-
tral Bank and the government that actually exists in practice.” Hence, the importance of de-
veloping continuous indices of independence in practice.
Thus, since Rogoff (1985) suggested the idea of strategically delegating into an inflation
averse Central Banker, a rich empirical literature emerged trying to measure independence
and trying to quantify its impact. According to Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) a Central Bank
is independent if its monetary policy is not influenced by political cycles or by the prefer-
ences of politicians. As an example of the empirical literature on Central Bank independ-
ence, Cukierman (1992) creates a 16-variable legal index for 68 countries, reporting data on
(i) hiring and firing rules for the Chairman; (ii) policy formulation; (iii) final objectives, and
(iv) borrowing limitations.
As a proxy for independence in practice he uses the average time (or turnover ratio) in
the position of Central Bank governor or chairman. Cukierman (1992, 383) clarifies that
there is no obvious measure of actual (in practice) independence as opposed to legal Central
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it is difficult to find a group of systematic measures of actual independence when this di-
verges from legal independence”. He finds that the measure of legal independence and the
turnover rate of the Central Bank governor differ by a larger amount in developing rather
than in developed countries. 
Cukierman and Webb (1995) calculate yet another variable of independence in practice
which they call (political) vulnerability index. This reflects the political influence in the cen-
tral bank by measuring the probability that the Central Bank governor will be replaced imme-
diately after a political change in government. They use a sample of 67 countries for the 1950
to 1989 period. They find that in a six months period the governor changes in half of the cases
after a non-radical (i.e., not related to a military rebellion, restoration of democracy or consti-
tutional change) political change. They find that it is much less likely that the governor
changes after six months of a routine transition in the Executive. There exists high variation
among countries, and a large difference between developing (change in one quarter of cases)
and developed countries (change in one tenth of cases). They also find that their measure is
correlated with the level and variance of inflation, with real growth and with real interest rates. 
The authors show that the frequency of governor changes is higher the closer the date of
the political transition. They stress that the political turnover measure by itself is an imper-
fect measure of independence in practice. A low ratio does not necessarily mean high inde-
pendence (in some cases such as Denmark, United Kingdom or Iceland it is; but not in oth-
ers such as countries with stable authoritarian regimes). Instead, they argue that a high ratio
does reflect low Central Bank independence, because high turnover ratios mean that the gov-
ernor’s period is shorter than the executive’s and this makes the governor more vulnerable
to the influence of the President or the political majorities. And hence will be less prone to
try to implement long run policies.
De Haan and Kooi (2000) analyze Central Bank independence in practice for 82 develop-
ing countries. They conclude that (lack of) independence is only correlated with inflation if we
take into account countries with large price increases. They report that independence works bet-
ter in developed rather than in developing countries.6 Table 1 summarizes the evidence.
Table 1
STUDIES MEASURING CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDECE IN PRACTICE
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Number 
Estimation
¿Does it
Variable measuring
Article of countries use a legal
(developing)
Period
index?
independence in practice
Cuikermann (1992) 68 (49) 1950-1989 YES Turnover Rate
Cuikermann et al. (1992) 71 (50) 1950-1989 YES Turnover Rate
Cuikermann and Webb (1995) 67 (47) 1950-1989 YES Vulnerability
Akhand 1998) 62 (40) 1960-1989 YES Turnover Rate and Vulnerability
De Haan and Kooi (2000) 82 (82) 1980-1989 NO Turnover Rate
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In this Section, we first explain the data collection process about the beginning and end
of the period in office of the head of TRA (Telecommunications Regulatory Authority). Next
we explain the construction of two variables that use the changes in the head of the agency
as a measure of independence in practice: the turnover rate and the inverse of vulnerability
index.
The first country in Latin America to create a TRA was Chile in 1977; subsequently, it
was in the nineties that Argentina (1990), Venezuela (1991), Colombia and Peru (1994) fol-
lowed. Until 2002 the remaining countries in the sub-continent created their TRA with dif-
ferent degrees of independence, roles and responsibilities.7 Among the 23 countries that we
analyze, in 17 of them the period in office of the TRA head is legally prescribed. Of these,
the law allows for re-election in 11 cases. The average age of a TRA as of 2004 was 9 years
old. Among the countries with a prescribed time limit, the shortest period is that of Colom-
bia (16 months) and the longest is Jamaica (7 years).8 Data on the creation of the agency and
the legal prescriptions for the duration in office are useful, since they give us how many
heads on average should the office have had by law. These two measures help us measure
legal independence.
3.1. Data collection
To create the turnover rate and the inverse of vulnerability index in Latin American TRA
it is key to have information about the exact date of beginning and end of the period in of-
fice of the head of the agency. There is no specific publication with data on regulator
turnover for our countries. There are some organizations such as Asociación Hispanoamer-
icana de Centros de Investigación y Empresas de Telecomunicaciones (AHCIET), the
World Bank (WB), the Comisión Interamericana de Telecomunicaciones (CITEL), the Foro
Latinoamericano de Entes Reguladores de Telecomunicaciones (REGULATEL), the Inter-
national Telecommunications Union (ITU), or the Caribbean Telecommunications Union
(CTU), where the TRA report data, news of interest and new laws and regulations, but in no
case do they report with periodicity about changes in the head of the agency.9
Therefore, to obtain the necessary data we resorted mainly to three groups of sources:
i) The TRA’s themselves. In some cases, in their web pages there are press bulletins,
decrees, contracts, speeches or notes about the beginning and/or end of the time in
office of the head.10, 11
ii) Data bases of news about the region, such as ISI Emerging Markets, ProQuest and
Lexis-Nexis. We also used the press of every country as well as contact with some
analysts or local telecommunications research centres.12
iii) Bulletins and web pages of the above mentioned organizations AHCIET, ITU and
REGULATEL.13
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the agency for 23 countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region for the period be-
tween 1990 and 2004.14
There is no precedent in the literature for measuring the independence in practice of TRA’s.
Taking then as a benchmark the above mentioned studies on Central Bank independence, we
construct two variables that try to reflect the independence in practice through (i) the change or
turnover of the director/chair of the TRA, namely the number of average months that the head
of office remains in his job, and based on this the frequency of change of regulator per year, and
(ii) the inverse index of political vulnerability, that is, the number of months that elapse between
a change in the country’s executive power and a change in the direction of the agency.
3.2. Turnover rate
The turnover rate measures the average actual duration in months of the time in office
of the director or chair of the agency. It is a simple and interesting figure. In many cases, the
regulator does not complete the prescribed period in office.15 The average duration of a reg-
ulator in Latin American and Caribbean TRA’s in the period 1990 to 2004 is approximately
two years and a half, being those of lowest duration those in Colombia, Nicaragua and Ar-
gentina and those of highest duration those in Belize, Peru and Jamaica (see Table 3). No-
tice that the most stable countries are former British colonies and Chile.
The turnover rate does not distinguish amongst the reasons behind the change of the reg-
ulator. It only captures the effect of any type of changes, from the end of the legal period to
resignations or removals for different reasons which diminish the effective time in the direc-
tion of TRA’s relative to what is prescribed by law.16 We also computed the frequency of
change, which denotes the average turnover per year in the TRA’s, a high frequency sig-
nalling continuous changes of regulator.
Note that the prescribed time in office can usually be evaded without violating the law,
but clearly affecting the degree of independence.17 If we focus on the 17 countries which
have a period established by law, only in four of them the regulator completed the full peri-
od: Belize, Jamaica, Uruguay and Peru (which actually goes beyond the prescribed period),
and the remainder (with the exception of Bolivia, Colombia and Surinam), stay in approxi-
mately half of the prescribed period (see Table 4).
3.3. Political Vulnerability Index
As mentioned above, Cukierman and Webb (1995) present an index of political vulner-
ability for Central Bank governors for countries all over the world. They argue that comput-
ing the turnover rate of the governor relative to political changes is important to evaluate the
size and effect of these in the frequency of regulatory turnover. They think of this index as
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ability of TRA’s is defined for each country as the fraction of political transitions that are
not quickly followed by a replacement in the director/chair of agency:
(1)
Cukierman and Webb (1995) use in the numerator the number of political replacements,
whereas we use the number of regulators that stay in his or her position for i months after a
political transition. The reason for the change is that we want to give a higher score to less
political influence in TRA. When measuring turnover in the head of TRA’s in Latin Amer-
ica, we find that in 61% of occasions there is a change in the head of the agency within 1
month. If we take six months, in 73% of times in which there is a change in president there
is turnover in the head of the TRA. If we take one year, the ratio rises to 88% (see Table 2).
Table 2
TURNOVER IN THE POSITION OF HEAD OF TRA
PERIOD: 1990-2004
Turnover (number of months since political transition)
Country 0-1 2-3 3-4 4-5 6-7 8-9 10-11 12 or more
1 Argentina 2 1
2 Barbados 1
3 Belice 0
4 Bolivia 1 1
5 Brasil 1
6 Chile 3
7 Colombia 1 1 1
8 Costa Rica 2
9 Dominican Rep. 2
10 Ecuador 4 1
11 El Salvador 2
12 Guatemala 2
13 Honduras 1 1
14 Jamaica 1
15 Mexico 1
16 Nicaragua 2
17 Panama 1 1
18 Paraguay 1 1
19 Peru 1
20 Surinam 2
21 Trinidad and Tobago 0
22 Uruguay 0
23 Venezuela 1 1
Add 25 3 0 2 2 2 2 5
Note: We only compute one change of agency head per political transition.
Vi i () , , , ≡ =
Number of regulators that stay in his or her position
for i months after a political transition
Number of political transitions
161 2
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six and twelve months after a political change in the country as periods of analysis for our
sample. The index of inverse vulnerability for the average of 23 analyzed countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean shows that TRA’s are 21% more vulnerable after 6 months rel-
ative to 1 month, and 9% more vulnerable after 1 year relative to six months (see Table 3).18
Table 3
INVERSE INDEX OF POLITICAL VULNERABILITY OF TRAs, TURNOVER RATE
(Average months in the job) AND FREQUENCY OF CHANGES PER YEAR
PERIOD: 1990-2004
Inverse of Vulnerability in Turnover Frecuency
Country
1 month 6 months 12 months
Rate of Changes
(months) (per year)
All Latin America 0.59 0.47 0.38 30 0.40
1 Argentina 0.33 0.00 0.00 16 0.73
2 Barbados 1.00 1.00 1.00 24 0.50
3 Belice 1.00 1.00 1.00 72 0.17
4 Bolivia 1.00 0.75 0.75 40 0.30
5 Brasil 1.00 1.00 1.00 24 0.50
6 Chile 0.00 0.00 0.00 36 0.33
7 Colombia 0.67 0.33 0.00 13 0.91
8 Costa Rica 0.00 0.00 0.00 22 0.56
9 Dominican Rep. 0.00 0.00 0.00 21 0.57
10 Ecuador 0.20 0.00 0.00 20 0.60
11 El Salvador 0.00 0.00 0.00 22 0.56
12 Guatemala 0.00 0.00 0.00 22 0.56
13 Honduras 1.00 0.50 0.00 18 0.67
14 Jamaica 1.00 1.00 1.00 60 0.20
15 Mexico 1.00 1.00 0.00 27 0.44
16 Nicaragua 0.00 0.00 0.00 15 0.80
17 Panama 0.50 0.00 0.00 27 0.44
18 Paraguay 0.67 0.67 0.33 22 0.56
19 Peru 1.00 0.50 0.50 66 0.18
20 Surinam 0.00 0.00 0.00 42 0.29
21 Trinidad and Tobago 1.00 1.00 1.00 18 0.67
22 Uruguay 1.00 1.00 1.00 48 0.25
23 Venezuela 0.67 0.67 0.67 24 0.50
Source: Computed by the authors.
Among the weaknesses of the index of inverse vulnerability for TRA’s, one is that it
does not take into account those changes in the regulator during the remainder of the presi-
dential period and which have a political motivation, be it because it took place after 1 year
since the political transition, or because there has been more than one change of regulator
during one president’s period. In some of these cases, they are forced resignations for polit-
ical motives or rivalries which do not involve a change in the executive.19 There are also
changes in the regulator due to cabinet reshuffles, promotions or resignations to run for elect-
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that they previously regulated, what is known in the literature as “revolving doors phenom-
enon”.21 These changes are not reflected in the index of inverse vulnerability, but the
turnover rate or the frequency of changes does capture them.
Another situation that is not measured in the vulnerability index are those cases where
the head of the agency is a member of the Executive (vulnerability 0.00) but where the pe-
riod in office is longer than the region’s average, especially in countries with high stability
in their cabinets and presidential periods.22
3.4. Indices of Independence in Law and in Practice (LPI and LPI-A)
The vulnerability index has a limitation when it comes to its use in statistical analysis:
it is an average figure for all the studied period, so that it only takes one value for the fifteen
years of the period. This limitation causes poor estimation results. In order to overcome this
limitation, we have created an Index of Independence in Law and in Practice (LPI), which
combines the time-varying legal Index of Regulatory Independence (IRI) shown in Montoya
and Trillas (2007)23 and the index of inverse vulnerability (one month), through the product
of both indices. As a result, the LPI is an index that varies over time and that captures the in-
dependence in law and in practice, being the first index of this type in the literature. It takes
into account the same information as IRI (or indices that are shown in Montoya and Trillas,
2007, to be highly correlated with this, such as the one presented in Gutiérrez, 2003a), and
it adds for the first time information about the degree of independence relative to the politi-
cal majorities.
We have also created an Index of Independence in Law and Practice –Accomplishment
(LPI-A) for 17 countries, which combines the time-varying Index of Regulatory Indepen-
dence (IR1) and the turnover rate (see table 4), through the product of both indices.
LPI-A measures legal and practice independence in a different way, by combining in-
formation on the actual fulfilment of norms, rules and laws concerning the time in office.
LPI-A has a piece of information which is not provided by LPI: the changes in the direction
of TRAs after more than one year since the new president or prime minister took office.
If we compare the behaviour of countries for both indices we find cases of countries
which keep in his position the director and respect the legally established period and coun-
tries that do not respect either of these.24 There are cases where the new government must
appoint a new TRA director by legal mandate, but it respects to some extent the duration of
the period established by law.25
By computing the relationship between the executive and the agency for all the govern-
ment’s tenure and not only in the first months, LPI-A corrects for one of the weaknesses pre-
viously mentioned for LPI.
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DURATION OF TRA’s HEADS BY LAW vs. TURNOVER RATE
(Only countries with duration prescribed by law)
PERIOD: 1990-2004
Country
Legally precribed Legally precribed Turnover Rate
Accomplishment
(years) (months) (months)
All Latin America (17) 45 4 3 260%
1 Argentina 5 60 16 27%
2 Barbados* 4 48 24 50%
3 Belice 6 72 72 100%
4 Bolivia 5 60 40 67%
5 Brasil 5 60 24 40%
6 Colombia 1.3 16 13 81%
7 Costa Rica 4 48 22 46%
8 Dominican Rep. 4 48 21 44%
9 Ecuador 4 48 20 42%
10 El Salvador 7 84 22 26%
11 Honduras 4 48 18 38%
12 Jamaica 5 60 60 100%
13 Paraguay 5 60 22 37%
14 Peru 5 60 66 110%
15 Surinam 5 60 42 70%
16 Trinidad y Tobago 3 36 18 50%
17 Uruguay 4 48 48 100%
* The years by law in Barbados are 5 and in Uruguay 6, but we only count 4, from its creation in 2001 to the
final year of our simple, 2004
Source: Computed by the authors.
3.5. Correlation Matrix
In Table 5 we show the correlation matrix of the variables of independence in practice,
taking into account vulnerability at one month, six months and one year. We also show cor-
relations with LPI, LPI-A and IR1.
Table 5
CORRELATION MATRIX
Practice Legal
Vulnerability Vulnerability Vulnerability
Index. Index. Index. LPI LPI-A IR1
1 month 6 month 12 month
Vulnerability Index. 1 month 1.00
Vulnerability Index. 6 month 0.92 1.00
Vulnerability Index. 1 month 0.76 0.86 1.00
Legal & Practice Index (LPI) 0.91 0.81 0.74 1.00
Legal & Practice Index Accomplishment (LPI-A) 0.83 0.73 0.70 0.83 1.00
Independence Regulation (IR1) 0.55 0.40 0.39 0.77 0.68 1.00
Source: Author’s calculations.
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periods that are compared (one month with six months, and six months with one year), the
values get closer to unity, which shows us that they are measuring basically the same phe-
nomenon.
The two indices that measure both legal independence and independence in practice, LPI
and LPI-A, are positively correlated with the inverse vulnerability measures, since the in-
dices included the measure of vulnerability. Their correlations with IR1 are positive, but far
from unity, which suggests that those independence indices, while not being necessarily con-
tradictory, measure different phenomena.
IR1 and the vulnerability indices have a positive but low correlation, showing that
these indices do not measure the same phenomenon. This clearly suggests that the in-
dices of independence in practice do add information which is not contained in the legal
indices.
4. The impact of independence
4.1. Econometric Approach
The purpose of this section is to use the indices constructed in the previous section to
perform similar exercises to those that have been carried out with legal indices of regulation.
To analyze the impact of independence on telecommunications performance, the general
model we use can be expressed as:
Yit = B1it + B2X2it + B3X3it + Bit (2)
where Xit = (X2it , X3it , … XKit) are the explanatory variables, including an independence
index and control variables. B = (B1 , B2 , … BK) are their respective coefficients and µit is
an error term. We use individual fixed and random effects for the 23 (LPI) and 17 (LPI-A)
countries.
The error term is modelled as:
µit = µi + µit (3)
where µi denotes non-observable individual effects and vit denotes the remainder of the residual.
This is a reduced form model, where the performance variable is the equilibrium value
of fixed lines penetration in telephony. In equilibrium, the determinants of this performance
include, besides regulatory conditions, supply and demand factors, mainly population densi-
ty determining cost conditions and GDP per capita determining demand. Following Gutier-
rez (2003) we do not use price data, because this is difficult to obtain to perform cross coun-
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developed structural model, which is beyond the scope of our exercise.
4.2. The performance variable
The performance dependent variable Yit in equation (1) is fixed telephone lines for every
100 inhabitants, obtained from the International Telecommunications Union data base. The
indices, LPI and LPI-A, are our main explanatory variables of interest. Since one of the goals
of our exercise is to compare the impact of our independence variables with legal independ-
ence variables previously used in the literature, we use the same dependent variable as these
previous studies (such as Gutierrez, 2003a), namely, fixed lines per 100 inhabitants.
This is certainly not an ideal performance variable, as it would be for example total sur-
plus in the telecommunications markets. However, fixed lines penetration is a commonly
used variable in this empirical literature, as shown in the papers by Wallsten (2003), Ros
(2003) and Gutierrez (2003a and b). It has the advantage that it is easy to obtain and compa-
rable across countries. It is obviously related to investment levels, which fits with the theo-
retical framework on the necessary credibility of institutions to sustain investment.
It would also be interesting to test the impact of independence on the penetration of new
services, such as mobile telephony and broadband Internet access. However, for most of our
sample years (1990-2004) fixed telephony was the main telecommunications market in the
countries we analyze, and the penetration of fixed telephony still experienced many prob-
lems and wide variabilility (as graph 1 shows for a selection of countries). Noll (2000) men-
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Graph 1. Main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. Four LA countriestions that a typical problem (one which precisely triggered the privatization and regulatory
reform wave of the 1990s) in regulated sectors of developing countries was the lack of a
good and reliable fixed telephony system.
We recognize that a careful analysis of the impact of regulatory independence on
mobile and broadband markets is an important task for future research. Preliminary re-
sults along these lines 26 show that independence has also a positive impact on these
markets. An advantage of the analysis using only fixed lines is that fixed telephony, at
least for most of our sample years and countries, is mainly a monopoly, so that we can
focus on regulatory variables and we do not lose much by ignoring competition meas-
ures. Such measures, however, become crucial if we analyse new telecommunications
markets.
4.3. Control and instrumental variables
Along the lines of other work in this field 27, we use GDPppp per capita (GDPppp), Ex-
ports plus Imports as percentage of GDP (XMgdp) and Density (people per sq-kilometre),
as control variables. We obtained those variables from the data base of the World Bank. We
expect that an increase in income per capita and/or trade are associated with higher demand
for telephone services. We also expect that a higher population density in the country is re-
lated to lower average costs for telephone services.
Due to possible correlation between LPI and the error term µit, we use instrumental
variables and test for endogeneity using the Hausman test. To find suitable instruments, we
need to find variables that have an independent effect on independence but that are not cor-
related with network expansion. We consider the following eight candidates as instrumen-
tal variables:
i) The TRA’Year of President. The tenure of presidents or prime ministers.
ii) The TRA’Democratic Age.
iii) The TRA’Herfindahl Index of the Legislature. 28, 29
iv) The TRA’Political Constraints (PolCon III), measuring the probability of policy re-
versals. 30, 31
v) The TRA’Economic Freedom Index, measuring if a country is open to free enter-
prise.
vi) The TRA’Overall Regulation, measuring an improving regulation of credit, work
and businesses. 32, 33
vii) The TRA’The total number of full time employees in the telecommunications com-
panies. 34, 35
viii) The TRA’The legal origin of the country, based on La Porta et al (2002), with a
value of 1 when the origin is English or Dutch, and zero when it is French. This
variable proxies for the degree of interventionism of the state in economic mat-
ters. 36, 37
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.4.4. Results
In each table, we first estimate the equation by OLS with fixed effects (1) and with random
effects (2). Next we use 2SLS in the regressions where independence (LPI or LPI) is assumed en-
dogenous and instrumental variables (IV) are used. First this is done with fixed effects (3 to 9)
and finally with random effects (10). We also used a semi-logarithmic model (Tables 7 and 9).
For the 15 years and 23 countries of our sample, Table 6 shows that higher independ-
ence (both legal and in practice) is associated with higher network expansion. In equations
1 to 4, 7 and 9 the coefficient for independence is positive and statistically significant.38 The
semi-log equation on Table 7 also shows that legal and practice independence is associated
with higher network expansion. In equations 1 to 4 and 6 to 9 the coefficient for independ-
ence is positive and statistically significant.
The results confirm those reported in most of previous studies39. However, most of the
coefficients are between 5 and 200 per cent higher than in the results of Montoya and Tril-
las (2007), where the model is estimated taking into account only legal independence.
Hence, measuring independence without taking into account de facto information tends to
under-estimate the impact of independence on telecommunications performance.
On Tables 6 and 7, the LPI independence index has a significant and positive effect in
equations (1) and (2). The null hypothesis of rejecting random effects through the Hausman
test shows that the hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level.
In the four regressions, GDP per capita and Trade are positive and significant determi-
nants of network expansion, but the magnitude of the effect is low: a one thousand dollar in-
crease in income per capita is associated to a very small growth in the network. The results
for this variable coincide with those obtained by Ros (1999 and 2003) and Gutierrez (2003a),
suggesting that the income elasticity of fixed telephony demand is quite low after some min-
imum threshold is achieved. Density has a positive, small and significant effect (equations 1
to 9). These results are also along the lines of previous studies.
The Hausman test shows that the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected.
This result is consistent with other studies on the impact of regulatory policies.40 We re-
port nevertheless the results with IV in equations (3) to (10). Given that the Hausman test
is contingent on the use of specific instruments, it could well be that better instruments
should be tried.
The results of equations using the LPI-A (Tables 8 and 9) for 17 countries do not differ
much from those obtained with LPI. The independence coefficients stay positive and signif-
icant in most equations. The control variables for income, international trade and population
density show as well similar coefficients than in previous regressions. Significance levels for
these control variables are slightly tighter, but bear in mind that the sample now is smaller:
six countries and 90 observations less.
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.The comparison between estimations using LPI and LPI-A suggest that both indices
measure the same phenomenon although with slightly different information. Countries
which change the regulator immediately after a change of administration, and countries that
have difficulties in respecting the legally established time period for regulators, will likely
face difficulties in encouraging investment to expand telephone lines. 
5. Conclusions
This article takes the suggestion made in the conclusions of several empirical studies on
the measurement and impact of regulatory independence, and makes the first effort to meas-
ure the practice of regulatory independence in TRA’s. The literature has evolved from a sem-
inal stage where independence was measured using a dummy 0-1 variable, to a stage where
the use of legal de jure independence indices has become quite common. Gutierrez (2003a)
is perhaps the study that has made most progress along these lines.
We take this evolution one step forward, by 
i) Obtaining detailed information about the practice of independence in 23 Latin
American and Caribbean countries between 1990 and 2004.
ii) Constructing with this information two indices of independence that combine legal
and practice issues, borrowing from the methodology used in the Central Bank In-
dependence literature.
iii) Quantifying the impact of this better measured regulator independence on network
penetration.
For example, the legal indices used so far computed the prescribed number of years that
the head of agency was allowed to stay in office. With our index, we correct this legal pre-
scription with the actual time period that the regulator is in office. Estimation results confirm
that regulator independence is associated to higher network penetration. However, the im-
pact would be underestimated if we only took into account a legalistic definition of inde-
pendence.
Our results on the impact of independence give an accurate picture of commitment dif-
ficulties to the extent that countries do not vary their ability to respect regulator independ-
ence for the whole sample period. This is because the legal part of our index varies over time,
but the practical part is an average. A limitation of our study is that we only compute the
ability to commit relative to investments in fixed telephony. We leave the study of the im-
pact of independence on mobile telephony penetration and broadband infrastructures for fu-
ture research. The work done so far, however, illustrates quite clearly the weaknesses of
purely legalistic approaches.
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1. See Levy and Spiller (1996).
2. Stern and Cubbin (2003), Pargal (2003), Edwards and Wavermann (2006), Gual and Trillas (2004 and 2006)
and Montoya and Trillas (2007) are representative of the line of research that construct mainly legal indices
and acknowledge the need for indices of independence in practice. See also Gutierrez (2003a), Ros (1999 and
2003), Viani (2006), Wallsten (2003), Ai et al. (2004) and Fink, Matto and Rathindran (2002).
3. See Eijffinger and De Haan (1996), De Haan and Kooi (2000) and Arnone, Laurens and Segalotto (2006).
4. Levine et al. (2005, 463) argue that “the fundamental rationale for an independent utilities regulator and an in-
dependent central banker is extremely similar”.
5. Levine et al. (2005) also point out notable differences between the task of strategically delegating into a cen-
tral banker and a regulator: slow asset depreciation and slow demand growth, compounded by a multiplicity
of tasks, make the challenge of delegating into an independent regulator more difficult than delegating into an
inflation averse central banker.
6. See also Akhand (1998).
7. In seven countries in the sample, the same agency also regulates other industries (such as electricity, water, or
postal services). For the purposes of this study, we use the acronym TRA to denote telecommunications reg-
ulatory agencies, even in the case that the same agency regulates other industries.
8. See Table A1 in the Appendix.
9. For more information and data about the index construction see Montoya & Trillas (2008).
10. For an analysis comparing the web sites of TRA in Latin America and the Caribbean, see Mahan (2005).
11. In the case of Belize the consultation with the TRA was by telephone.
12. In the case of Mexico, for example, we contacted the Instituto del Derecho de las Telecomunicaciones (IDET),
the Programa de Investigación de las Telecomunicaciones from Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económi-
ca (CIDE) and a specialised editorialist in newspaper Reforma.
13. Their web pages are: http://www.ahciet.net (AHCIET), http://www.itu.int (ITU), http://www.regulatel.org
(REGULATEL).
14. For Haiti and Guyana it was impossible to obtain complete data for the period. We also exclude Cuba and
Puerto Rico for their specific political or market characteristics.
15 There are some striking examples in the region. Argentina changed the regulator almost a dozen times since
the creation of the agency in 1990, including two interventions (2002 y 2004) where the government removed
the board and assigned a controller who took charge of the application of government’s policy in the sector.
In Ecuador, between 1995 and 2004 there were six presidents in the country and the same number of regula-
tors. 
16. The local press mentioned colourful scandals around some turnover episodes, such as one of telephone spy-
ing related to France Telecom in El Salvador, or due to alleged nepotism in Panama, where the spouse of the
private secretary of the country’s president was appointed as regulator. There are also cases of removals in
Mexico or Peru due to bad practices to benefit the incumbent firm.
17. For example, in Costa Rica the general regulator is appointed by the executive by law and for the same peri-
od as the president, allowing for re-election, but there is no re-election for the country’s president. In practice,
the regulator has never been re-elected. Another potentially interesting issue is that the retirement age can be
a way to appoint an official for a short period of time, as the Pravas (2003) report suggests for the case of India.
For Latin America and the Caribbean, only Belize prescribes 55 years old as the retirement age, but it has not
affected the period in office of the regulator. There can also be changes in the regulator by changing the rules
108 FRANCESC TRILLAS AND MIGUEL ÁNGEL MONTOYAof the agency. For example, in the case of Mexico, a new president in the country can change the rules (some-
thing the executive can do) without being necessary to change the law and after changing the commissioners. 
18. Barbados, Brazil and Jamaica are the only Latin American and Caribbean countries where the new country’s
president kept the same director at least for one year after taking office. In Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador and Guatemala when the president takes office, by law, the president must choose a new agency’s
head.
19. One of the most representative cases is Argentina, where there have been 11 directors of CNC (previously CNT)
in our period, and we only counted three for the index. Only in the presidency of Carlos Menem there were 7 dif-
ferent directors. The local press also reflects other cases of political pressures to force the resignation of the di-
rector, like in Bolivia, Brazil and Panama; or resignations due to differences amongst cabinet ministers, like in
Chile; or resignations due to a change in party membership of the head of the agency, like in Nicaragua.
20. We find examples in Mexico, where a director became cabinet minister; in Nicaragua and Venezuela two reg-
ulators became ministers. In Paraguay one agency head resigned to run for Parliament elections.
21. In Nicaragua a Director General became executive of the country’s subsidiary of the Spanish electricity firm
Unión FENOSA. In Panama a former regulator founded and chaired a local and long distance telecommuni-
cations firm; in Colombia a former commissioner founded a consulting firm working for a cellular telephony
firm; in Paraguay the government appointed the president of the agency as director general of the state-owned
telecommunications monopoly. For an analysis of the revolving door phenomenon, see for example Che
(1995) and Salant (1995).
22. Chile is the clearest of these cases. It has a low inverse vulnerability index, but the period in office of the
telecommunications deputy secretary (the non-independent regulator, actually a cabinet minister) is longer
than the region’s average. For our period, in this country there has been only one regulator that has not fin-
ished his period with the country’s president. 
23. IRI has 10 components which measure legal independence, along the same lines as the indices of Edwards and
Waverman (2006) and Gual and Trillas (2004 and 2006). 
24. In the first case we find Bolivia, Peru and Jamaica. In the second we find Argentina and Paraguay.
25. Surinam is an example where the director is appointed in the first month of the new government and stays in
his position for 42 months on average (the fourth that stays for longer in the region) of the 60 established by
law. In Colombia the duration by law is 16 months and the real duration is 13 months. 
26. Reported in Montoya (2007) where it is shown in a simple econometric exercise that independence in practice
has a positive and significant impact on the penetration of mobile telephony and broadband. 
27. See Gutierrez (2003a), Ros (1999) and Wallsten (2003).
28. These data come from the “Political Institutions Data Base” of the World Bank. See Beck et al. (2001) and
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/other_data.html
29. For the study of telecommunications, this data base has been used by Li and Xu (2002).
30. The data base on “policy constraints” due to Henisz (2000) is based on four variables that help estimate the
probability of policy reversal for the period between 1900 and 2004, for 234 countries.
31. For the study of the privatization, liberalization and regulation of telecommunications, it has been used by
Henisz and Zeller (2001), Gual and Trillas (2004 and 2006) and mentioned by Gutierrez (2003b). Henisz, Zel-
ner and Guillen (2005) create and use a data base with three variables to measure (formal) regulator independ-
ence, competition and privatization for 205 countries in the period 1960-1999. Both data bases can be obtained
in http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/
32. The Fraser Institute creates, for 129 countries in the period 1970-2004, the data base about “Economic Free-
dom in the World”, with 29 variables, related to i) government size; ii) legal structure and safety of property
rights; iii) access to safe money; iv) freedom of trade; v) regulation of credit, work and businesses. See Gwart-
ney and Lawson (2005) and http://www.freetheworld.com/
109 The degree of Commitment to Regulator Independence: Measurement and Impact33. These indices have been used for the study of telecommunications by Gutierrez (2003b).
34 The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) publishes its own data base with 83 input and perform-
ance variables for 150 countries. See http://www.itu.int/home/index.html.
35. Efficiency data have been used by Ros (2003), Gual and Trillas (2004 and 2006) and by Gutierrez (2003a).
36. The data base reported in La Porta et.al (2002) informs about the legal origin of countries’ institutional sys-
tems.
37. In the study of telecommunications Gual and Trillas (2004) have used this data base. La Porta has also partic-
ipated in the construction of a data base containing 20 variables about governance, institutions and social is-
sues for 135 countries between 1960 and 2000 in Glaeser et al. (2004). These data have not been used in the
study of telecommunications, to our knowledge. Both data bases can be found in 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html
38. In all equations we also used year dummy variables without significant changes in the results.
39. See Gutierrez (2003a) and Ros (2003).
40. See Ros (2003), Dewenter and Kruse (2006), Edwards and Waverman (2006) and Viani (2006).
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Resumen
Este estudio elabora medidas del grado de independencia en la práctica de los reguladores de telecomunicacio-
nes para 23 países de América Latina y el Caribe entre 1990 y 2004. Nos centramos en el grado en que los go-
biernos son capaces de comprometerse a preservar la independencia de sus reguladores. Combinamos esta infor-
mación con datos sobre independencia legal para construir índices de independencia de la regulación que son más
realistas que los que se han utilizado en la literatura existente. Los resultados econométricos confirman que la in-
dependencia de la regulación tiene un impacto positivo sobre el desempeño del sector de las telecomunicaciones,
pero los índices puramente legales infravaloran este impacto.
Palabras claves: regulación, independencia, delegación estratégica, telecomunicaciones.
Clasificación JEL: L51, L96.
APPENDIX
Table A1
THE 23 TRA’s ANALYZED IN THIS STUDY
Year of
Legally prescribed
Country Nama of Agency numbre of years for
Creation
the regulator
Argentina Comisión Nacional de Comunicaciones 1990 5
(CNN)
Barbados Fair Trading Commission (FTC) 2001 5 (with possibility
of re-election)
Belice Public Utilities Commission (PUC) 1999 6 (with possibility
of re-election)
Bolivia Superintendencia de Telecominicaciones 1995 5
(SITTEL)
Brasil Agencia Nacional de Telecomunicaciones 1997 5 (with possibility
(ANATEL) of re-election)
Chile Subsecretaría de Telecomunicaciones 1977 Not defined
(SUBTEL)
Colombia Comisión de Regulación de 1994 1.3 (16 months)
Telecomunicaciones (CRT)
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THE 23 TRA’s ANALYZED IN THIS STUDY
(Continued)
Year of
Legally prescribed
Country Nama of Agency numbre of years for
Creation
the regulator
Costa Rica Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios 1996 4 (with possibility
Públicos (ARESEP) of re-election)
Dominican Republic Instituto Dominicano de 1998 4 (with possibility
Telecomunicaciones (INDOTEL) of re-election)
Ecuador Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones 1995 4 (with possibility
(CONATEL) of re-election)
El Salvador Superintendencia General de Electricidad 1996 7 (with possibility
y Telecomunicaciones (SIGET) of re-election)
Gautemala Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones 1996 Not defined
(SIT)
Honduras Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones 1995 4 (with possibility
(CONATEL) of re-election)
Jamaica Office of Utilities Regulation (OUR) 1995 Between 3 and 7
Mexico Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones 1996 Not defined
(COFETEL)
Nicaragua Instituto Nicaragüense de 1995 Not defined
Telecomunicaciones y Correos (TELCOR)
Panama Ente regulador de Servicios Públicos (ERSP) 1996 Not defined
Paraguay Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones 1996 5
(CONATEL)
Peru Organismo Supervisor de la Inversión 1994 5 (with possibility
Privada en Telecomunicaciones (OSITEL) of re-election)
Surinam Telecommunicatie Authoriteit Suriname 1998 5 (with possibility
(TAS) of re-election)
Trinidad & Tobago Telecommunications Authority of Trnidad 2002 3
& Tobago (TATT)
Uruguay Unidad Reguladora de los Servicios de 2001 6 (with possibility
Telecomunicaciones (URSEC) of re-election)
Venezuela Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones
(CONATEL)
Source: Agencies, AHCIET and ITU.
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